a1 World Bank and CEPR
This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Reports on United States–Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 DSU – EC) (WT/DS294/AB/RW, 14 May 2009) and United States–Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 DSU – Japan) (WT/DS322/AB/RW, 18 August 2009). The Appellate Body found that the United States had not brought its anti-dumping measures into compliance with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as it continued to use zeroing in annual reviews of anti-dumping orders. We argue that this conclusion – based on a complicated discussion of what constitutes a ‘measure taken to comply’ – could have been reached through a much simpler and direct argument. Continued noncompliance by the United States generates costs to traders targeting the United States and the trading system more generally. We argue that from a broader WTO compliance perspective consideration should be given to stronger multilateral surveillance of anti-dumping practice by all WTO members and to more analysis and effective communication by economists regarding the costs of zeroing and anti-dumping practices more generally.
(Online publication March 31 2011)
The paper is a contribution to The American Law Institute project on the case law of the WTO, led by Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis. We thank Marco Bronckers, Chad Bown, and Tom Prusa for helpful discussions and Henrik Horn, Rob Howse, Petros Mavroidis, and participants in the June 7, 2010 American Law Institute conference in Geneva for comments on the first draft. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to our employers.